By now, most Americans have learned the story of how U.N. Ambassador Samantha Power, who was kidnapped, tortured, and killed in Libya in September, 2014, by Islamist rebels.
In that same month, a second ambassador, Christopher Stevens, was murdered in Benghazi, Libya, by a terrorist group linked to al-Qaida.
On January 7, 2015, the United States declared war on Islamic State (ISIS) and its extremist affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, formerly ISIS/ISILF), and the group’s self-declared caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
It also announced a new counterterrorism strategy called the “Countering Violent Extremism” (CVE), which sought to counter the “violent ideologies and hateful ideology of ISIL.”
As the White House noted, the new strategy would “make it easier to identify, disrupt, and defeat violent extremists who threaten the United Kingdom and other democracies.”
While the White Book of Principles on Combating Violent Extremists, issued in 2014, laid out guidelines for the administration’s counterterrorism efforts, the administration largely ignored the lessons from Libya.
According to an analysis of official U.K. government documents released in 2016, there were few signs of change to the U,S., and U.A.C.P. counterterrorism strategy in 2016.
The United Kingdom’s response to the rise of ISIS was largely based on an existing counterterrorism strategy and, in some cases, on an earlier draft, which had not been updated since 2007.
In September, the White Council for National Security (WCNS) released a report on the U.,S., AQIM, and other violent extremist groups, arguing that the UPA was failing to implement the UCP’s counter-terrorism strategy.
The report called for the UUP and the UAP to create an “exemplary, coherent counter-extremism strategy” that would include “the provision of security, training, and intelligence support for local authorities.”
The WCNS, which has been a member of the government since 2009, is chaired by the UK’s Deputy Prime Minister, James Brokenshire.
But while the White council has been advocating for a more robust counter-terrorist strategy, the government has not been taking action to make that a reality.
The U.KS National Security Strategy, issued by the Cabinet Office in April 2017, did not include an “appropriate counter-radicalization strategy” and instead recommended a series of “steps that will help to identify and prevent extremist ideologies and violent extremism in the UK.”
According to the WCNS’ report, this approach was “designed to provide a common framework for the delivery of counter-violent extremism training, assessment, and advice.”
In response to this failure, the Conservative Party, which controls the House of Commons, called for a review of the UPMC.
A parliamentary inquiry into the government’s response was held in February, and the report was published in the UUK’s official journal, The Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies.
As it describes, “a new strategy for countering violent extremism was proposed” and recommended that the government “seek to identify the radicalization and radicalization process in the community in which individuals and groups are forming and to identify those communities that are vulnerable to radicalization.”
The UPMCs report, which was endorsed by the Joint Terrorism Task Force, also called for “a strategy to counter violent extremism and terrorism in the public sphere, and to strengthen the capacity of local authorities to address extremism and prevent terrorism.”
While these recommendations seem promising, they do not go far enough.
While the UPUC has been criticized for not following the recommendations of the WCNSS, the report does note that the strategy was “not endorsed by other government bodies and has not yet been formally reviewed.”
to the government, it was “taken into account and considered in its deliberations” in order to determine how best to address the issue.
The WCN has called for more information from the government on the strategy, including how it would be implemented and how it will help counter extremism.
Yet while the UNAIDS report has highlighted the need to “develop an effective strategy for addressing radicalization, particularly in young adults, it does not mention the UTP [Countering Terrorism Task Team] or the UBR [Counter-Belligerent Forces] at all.”
And the report did not recommend any additional counterterrorism measures.
It does not say how the strategy will be implemented, nor does it say how it could help address the threat of violent extremism.
The lack of transparency surrounding the strategy also undermines efforts to counter extremist ideology.
For example, the WCNs report does not discuss the existence of any counterterrorism measures in place to prevent the radicalisation of individuals.
Nor does it include the “tactical measures”